The notion that a direct military threat from China justifies the proposal is insupportable by evidence at this time.Ĭommitting to a nuclear submarine purchase under AUKUS without undertaking such analysis represents putting the cart before the horse. The strategic policy assumptions underpinning nuclear propulsion are unclear and unargued. While the promise of a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines is tantalising to some in Australia’s defence establishment, the decision on how to replace our existing fleet of Collins-class submarines should be based on a clear-eyed examination of Australia’s unique strategic requirements, along with an in-depth analysis of strategic circumstances and strategic challenges. These include a preoccupation with perceived threats that distracts us from basing strategic policy on Australia’s national interests, a reliance on notions of “mateship” with the great and powerful based more on sentiment and selective reading of history than on present-day reality, and the desire for a “sovereign” naval industry. And AUKUS places Australia squarely into the USA-China contest, without any accompanying US guarantee of military assistance if Australia were to find itself in danger.Īustralia’s eagerness to jump at the chance to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, blithely ignoring both the practical challenges of acquiring and operating such vessels and the risk involved in committing to such a significant purchase, exemplifies systemic problems in our approach to defence policy. As a non-nuclear weapons state in good standing, Australia would need to settle an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency to cover Highly Enriched Uranium fuelling the reactors. The RAN has no experience or expertise in operating such submarines, meaning that it would be left dependent on the US or UK for construction and training. More to the point, it also remains unclear, at best, whether the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines would be in Australia’s best interests. The last is still on the way.īoth submarines will be nearing obsolescence if and when they are delivered, needing to be superseded by as-yet-unannounced designs, further complicating matters and potentially extending delivery timelines into the 2060s. The USA’s shipyards are struggling to meet its own requirements for the former, let alone Australia’s, while the UK has taken nearly two decades to construct seven of the latter. When, or whether, Australia might actually ever see delivery of either the options notionally available to it via AUKUS-the US-designed Virginia-class submarine and the UK-designed Astute class-is very much open to question. Nearly 18 months later, AUKUS remains essentially an exercise in political theatre, lacking in both legal enforceability and a wealth of practical detail-and Australia is no closer to the actual acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines than it was when the agreement was announced. The headline feature of this “enhanced trilateral security partnership” between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America was its “ to a shared ambition to support Australia in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy.” The AUKUS agreement was announced to much fanfare in September 2021. NAPSNET SPECIAL REPORT BY ALLAN BEHM TALK US THROUGH AUKUS…AND AUSTRALIA’S DREAM SUBMARINE FEBRUARY 22 2023 This report is published under a 4.0 International Creative Commons License the terms of which are found hereīanner image: Nautilus Institute from AI image generator Craiyon here II. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on significant topics in order to identify common ground. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. This study was published by The Australia Institute here He concludes that: “The question should be whether strategic policy requires nuclear submarines, not how policy should accommodate them because of their availability.”Īllan Behm is Director, International & Security Affairs Program, The Australia Institute. In this report, Allan Behm argues that the 2021 AUKUS agreement “remains essentially an exercise in political theatre, lacking in both legal enforceability and a wealth of practical detail-and Australia is no closer to the actual acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines than it was when the agreement was announced.
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